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Maurice Crul & Frans Lelie

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Measuring the impact of diversity attitudes and practices of people without migration background on inclusion and exclusion in ethnically diverse contexts. Introducing the diversity attitudes and practices impact scales

Maurice Crul [ID] and Frans Lelie [ID]

Sociology Department, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands

ABSTRACT
Assimilation and integration processes have been studied widely and for many years, mainly by looking at the attitudes and practices of people with migration background. This article focusses on the mirror group: the people without migration background. Based on a literature review we propose a new model, the Diversity Attitudes and Practices Impact (DAPI) scales, to assess the impact they have on inclusion and exclusion in ethnically diverse contexts. We test the model using new data on Rotterdam, a superdiverse majority minority city with a large share of voters for anti-immigrant parties. Though the attention, both in research and in the public debate, is focussed on the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe and the United States, the outcomes of our DAPI-scales model demonstrate that, counter to what is expected, the most probable trend in Rotterdam is towards more socio-economic inclusion and more openness to cultural diversity.

Introduction

In the last 50 years, researchers in the field of migration and ethnic studies have primarily focussed on immigrants and their descendants, seeking to answer questions on how they integrate into the receiving society. Many claimed that this is actually a two-way process, also involving the people without migration background. There is, however, still very little research

CONTACT Maurice Crul ✉ m.r.j.crul@vu.nl

on how people without migration background react to the people with migration background they encounter in ethnically diverse settings in their neighbourhoods, the schools their children attend, or in their workplaces. Do they appreciate to live in an ethnically diverse context? How do they act in practice during their day-to-day interactions with people with migration background? And how do they use a potential position of power to include or exclude people with migration background? In most integration or assimilation research, at the most, people without migration background have been included as the norm group or comparison group to which other ethnic groups are compared. This has put the focus in research heavily on the attitudes and practices of the members of ethnic minority groups, resulting in what has been referred to as the "ethnic lens" or "ethnicization" (Crul 2016; Dahinden 2016; Emirbayer and Desmond 2012; Favell 2016; Glick Schiller, Çağlar, and Guldbrandsen 2006; Wimmer 2013). It almost seems that the people without migration background are not part of societal processes in ethnically diverse contexts (Schinkel and Schinkel 2018). This is remarkable given their dominance in positions of power. There is little research into their attitudes and practices in relation to people of migrant background and how this impacts societal outcomes. With this article, we want to fill that void.

Our field even lacks a precise and widely accepted definition for the group without migration background used across different country contexts. Researchers use terms like natives, mainstream population, majority population, people of native white descent, people without migration background, "Anglo-Saxon Whites", or "Non-Hispanic Whites". In this article, we will address our target category as *people without migration background*. We use the term category, to assert there is no such thing as a homogeneous group of people without migration background. As we will also show empirically, the category internally is strongly divided in terms of their attitudes and practices towards issues of ethnic diversity. It is especially this internal diversity which we will explore and implement in our theoretical model. We define the category as people who are born in the country and whose both parents are born in the country. For this article, we analyse new data on people without migration background living in majority minority neighbourhoods in Rotterdam. The term majority minority, initially used in the American context, refers to a context where all groups, also the old majority group, form a numerical minority.

The central research question we want to answer in this article is: what is the impact is of the attitudes and practices of people without migration background on inclusion and exclusion in an ethnically diverse context. We will formulate a new theoretical framework and a methodological approach to answer this question.

Building blocks for a new theoretical model

This section explores the existing literature to identify concepts and possible building blocks to develop a theoretical framework to study the attitudes and practices of people without migration background in ethnically diverse settings. We use literature coming from various disciplines (Sociology, Economics, Political Science, Anthropology and Social Psychology) as they all bring different pieces of the puzzle to the table. First, we will discuss the importance to include the positions of power of people without migration background. Next, we discuss which explanations the literature offers on why people without migration background defend their category's privilege and resist increased ethnic diversity. This resistance is often framed in terms of a perceived economic competition and or cultural threat. After this we focus on what the existing literature has to offer on why people without migration background, while belonging to the dominant category in the existing ethnic hierarchy, in contrast would push for more inclusion and equality of people with migration background. The purpose of this exercise is to identify the key drivers for a theoretical framework that describes and analyses the attitudes and practices of both exclusion and inclusion by people without migration background. The model will show the potential impact of these opposite attitudes and practices on ethnically diverse settings.

Including the positions of power

In the field of migration and ethnic studies different assimilation and integration theories (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993) have been introduced to explain the social mobility of immigrant groups compared to each other and compared to the group without migration background. The authors of these theories argue that some groups move up because they adapt to norms and values of the mainstream or majority population, while other groups resist assimilation and move up by sticking to their own value systems and making use of the social cohesion in their own ethnic group. One of the mayor flaws in these theories has been the lack of analysis of the positions of power of people with and without migration background to influence these outcomes. Alba (2009), for instance, has presented the rise of children of immigrants into more prestigious professional positions potentially as non-zero-sum game for the power position of the people without migration background. He argues that the generation of Anglo-Saxon White baby boomers will retire, while a new, more ethnically diverse generation will take up their power positions. In the cultural domain, a similar non-consequential view has been dominant. Here, the mainstream is largely seen as changing over time by absorbing members of new ethnic

groups and, in the process, becoming enriched by new cultural elements and habits. This results in what Alba (2019) has described as the blurring of ethnic boundaries and the opening up of the mainstream. Alba and Nee (2019) do acknowledge a potential resistance of Anglo-Saxon Whites against losing the dominant position: "The majority is often invested in preserving a bright boundary because it helps to defend the systematic advantages that majority individuals enjoy" (2019, 408). Alba and Nee go on by saying: "Assimilation's one-sided conception of change overlooked the value and sustainability of minority cultures and in addition, masked barely hidden ethnocentric assumptions about the superiority of Anglo-American culture" (2019, 403). These observations about the potential use of power by the people without migration background on assimilation and integration outcomes, however, have not been central to neo and segmented assimilation theories. Assimilation outcomes in these theories are largely determined by character-istics of people *with* migration background making their way into society. By becoming similar economically and culturally over time, in other words "assimilated", the differences in power positions are supposed to dissolve. How people without migration background influence these outcomes by their attitudes and practices remains largely absent in these theories. As Crul (2016) argues, the integration context seems largely taken for granted or as a given.

The literature on race and whiteness is addressing the element of power much more prominent. Starting with Du Bois (1920, 1923), and more recently Roediger (1991) and Jacobson (1998), power has been an important concept in disentangling racial dominance and privilege. How white people continue to preserve their positions of power with the increased ethnic diversity into present-day society is on the agenda of a new generation of "whiteness" scholars (For an overview see Twine and Gallagher 2008). This literature emphasizes that white people profit from their white privilege in various ways and will defend that privilege. When these privileges are challenged, for instance through the upward social mobility of people with migration background, this can potentially trigger negative attitudes and practices. The reviewed literature describes how the feeling of loss of privilege is often met with sharp emotions stemming from a deeply engrained sense of entitlement (Frankenberg 2001; Lipsitz 1998; Twine and Gallagher 2008; Wekker 2016). But, as some of the above authors (Roediger 1991; Jacobson 1998) in this field showed, white people historically have also used their power to counter racial discrimination and dominance. This two-sided aspect of having positions of power and using these either to keep power or to change power relations offers a core building block for our theoretical framework. We agree with Wimmer (2013) that we need to study rather than take for granted the power relationship between people with and without migration background.

We take from the literature, that people without migration background, belonging to the category in the more privileged position than people with migration background, will usually have more power to determine outcomes. The use of these positions of power can either be characterized by coercion to keep the upper hand or, on the contrary, can be used to build more equal relations and create more cultural openness.

Exclusion and rejection of cultural differences

We will first give a short overview of the literature discussing how and why people without migration background defended their existing positions of power by exclusion and rejection of cultural differences. This has often been described in terms of perceived threat and competition. When it comes to the economic domain, economists have most extensively written about economic threat and competition (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade and Hemstead 1996; Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Olzak 1992; Manevska and Achterberg 2011) and the idea of a split labour market (Bonacich 1972; Boswell 1986) or the ethnic segmentation of the labour market (Bauder 2001; Clairmont et al. 1983). The concept of economic threat refers to people competing for similar, scarce jobs. In the literature there has especially been an emphasis on working-class white people in relation to economic competition. Increased economic vulnerability due to temporary and so-called flexible contracts, especially in the working class, is seen as an important trigger for the perception of economic threat or competition in relation to other ethnic groups. At the same time there are also studies criticizing the overemphasis on the working class, arguing that the (lower) middle class is more vulnerable for such sentiments (Bhambra 2017; Crul and Lelie 2019).

In the past decade, sociologists, like Lamont (2002) and Hochschild (2016), have used qualitative research to analyse how lower middle-class and working-class people make sense of their position in the workplace in the era of globalization and flexible and temporary job contracts. This sociological lens gives an insight in the mechanisms that sustain and enforce the existing power hierarchy in the workplace through ethnic and racial lines. In her book "The Dignity of Working Men", Lamont connects the economic literature on competition and threat to the sociological literature on identity by scrutinizing the social meaning of being a working-class native white man. A crucial concept in Lamont's work is dignity, which for working men is linked to hard work and an honest wage. In our current globalized world with flexible and temporary contracts this has become much harder to achieve. Labour rights and house ownership are under threat, and the perspective that children will have a better future than their working-class parents remains unclear. Lamont shows how working-class white people

actively construct and defend boundaries in the ethno-racial hierarchy, in relation to their own working-class identity and dignity. Much of the research into this topic is focussed on the attitudes of men rather than that of women. Hochschild, however, has a focus on both men and women. In "Strangers in their own land" (2016), Hochschild discusses the socio-economic stagnation of the native white working and lower middle class. She explicitly connects this to resentment about other ethnic and racial groups "cutting the line" in pursuing the American dream (Hochschild, 142, 143). Especially welfare and positive discrimination schemes are mentioned by Hochschild's respondents as ways to get undue advantages. A similar claim of being under attack, we find in the literature in the cultural domain. Culturism, as some authors have coined this (Mepschen 2016), represents the national culture of native white people as a threatened entity that must be protected against other ethno-racial groups. This research echoes some of the earlier work about cultural racism (Balibar, Wallerstein, and Turner 1991; Tacquieff 1988) in which racism is legitimized as a form of cultural protectionism by native white people. With this, the concept of racism was reversed.

Gest (2016) analyses how these sentiments have translated into politics. In "The New Minority. White working-class politics in an age of immigration and inequality" he argues that the white working-class people's political rebellion is driven by a sense of deprivation because they do not have a central position and place in society anymore (Gest 2016, 16; See also Crul, Scholten, and van der Laar 2019). In their view, the traditional working-class parties seem to care more about ethnic minorities than about them. There is political outreach to middle- and higher-class voters, but marginalized communities are ignored (Crul, Scholten, and van der Laar 2019, 28). Democrats in the US, and social democratic and socialist parties in Europe have abandoned their traditional constituency, opening up the possibility for Trump to attract the working-class Democrat voter for his anti-migration policy and for the UK Independence Party (Ukip) to attract the working-class Labour voter with its anti-migration and anti-Europe populism (Crul, Scholten, and van der Laar 2019, 123).

In sum, the reviewed literature emphasizes that in the economic domain competition and economic vulnerability are key drivers for anti-immigrant sentiments. Based on a form of entitlement in the ethnic hierarchy this can lead to resentment and a feeling of being under threat (reversed discrimination). A similar sentiment of being under threat is also found in the cultural domain where the dominance of ethnically defined cultural norms and values of the national group are seen as being under threat. While perceiving to be under threat, this group expresses to feel that politicians have abandoned them and are ignoring their complaints.

Inclusion and cultural openness

There is a whole body of literature explaining why people without migration background would protect their existing positions of power and privileges and feel threatened. The literature exploring the opposite tendency is much smaller. Yet, we do know from research from various disciplines that a large share of the people without migration background actively enjoys living in a multi-ethnic setting and supports equality of people of different ethnic and racial backgrounds. The findings from most assimilation and integration studies show that people without migration background in general show acceptance and openness to other ethnic groups and feel comfortable living in ethnically diverse settings [See for a recent example Jimenez "The Other Side of Assimilation" (2017)].

An important explanation for this is that in liberal left-leaning circles there has been a consistent support for anti-colonial and anti-racist viewpoints. These viewpoints often included strong critique on the power structures in place and the resulting injustice and inequality along ethnic and racial lines. At times this would include a strong cultural relativistic standpoint against the putative superiority of native white culture, or even an outright rejection of native white culture as an expression of dominance linked with neo-colonialism and racism.

Another important line of argument is that people without migration background can feel aligned with people with a migration background because they feel they have other identities or aspect of life in common. Race and ethnicity, in isolation, cannot capture people's full lived experiences or multiple affiliations. Social relationships built on other markers can explain why people without migration background will be open to more equal relationships with people with migration background, contributing to a change in the power relations. These forms of solidarity or identification across ethnic lines could potentially also be an important driver for a position of inclusion and cultural openness.

Next to this, some authors also emphasize the potential gains for people without migration background in the process towards more equality. In his book "Land of Strangers" (2012, 126), Amin addresses this:

> A start would be to make cause once again for the plural, open and collective society as the basis of facing the future, by showing the gains to be had – for *majorities* (our emphasis) and minorities and for indigenes and strangers from a multi-vocal and democratic sphere … .

Fukuyama (2018) also stresses this argument from a liberal and democratic perspective of justice and equality in which the acceptance of different forms of sub-identities as equal will create a more stable society and a better place to live for everybody. More equal relationships have the potential

to unarm conflict and reduce feelings of threat through connection. The psychological human need for living together in harmony is a crucial gain which has not been much acknowledged in existing ethnic threat and conflict theories.

A further important line of argument for our theoretical framework is the social-psychology literature around contact theory. From Allport onwards there has been an enormous effort by social psychologists to understand how and when interethnic contact will lead to mutual understanding, a feeling of security and safety and or friendships (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1971, 1998). It is impossible to summarize this body of work for this article without doing so inadequately. We take from this literature that interethnic contact can lead to a more positive opinion about members of other ethno-racial groups. This body of literature sheds light on some of the conditions under which interethnic contacts will more likely lead to a more positive attitude (See for more recent studies: Lee and Fiske 2006; Kervyn, Fiske, and Yzerbyt 2015).

In sum, based on the literature, we see that social justice and anti-discrimination arguments are important drivers for supporting inclusion and openness. This could also potentially result in gains like feelings of safety and harmony for the people who practice it. Interethnic contact could be another driver for a more open and inclusive stand of people without migration background.

Building a theoretical model taking into account the different attitudes and diversity practices and positions of power of people without migration background

This review provides us with the following building blocks for a new theoretical model. As the starting point, we take the concept of power in the relationship between people with and without migration background. We argue, again based on the literature, that the people without migration background usually have more power to determine the outcomes in this relationship due to their privileged position. We assume that people without migration background can use this power to sustain and enhance their privileged position, but also can use it to break down barriers and create a more open and inclusive environment. We propose to study both mechanisms as they usually will occur simultaneously in ethnically diverse contexts. We want to stress that the attitudes and practices of people without migration background do, of course, not exist in a vacuum. Far from it. People with migration background also exercise power and are a major part of the dynamic towards change in society. In this article, however, we focus on the impact of people without migration background.

A further building block for our theoretical model is the methodological assessment of the impact of people without migration background. Brubaker is one of the researchers (2005) who stressed the relational and processual aspects in everyday interactions regarding issues of diversity. In the literature from the different disciplines, but especially from social psychology, there has been an emphasis on the distinction between attitudes and practices. Contact theory, for instance, makes the claim that the practice of getting to know people from different ethnic and racial backgrounds influences people's attitudes. Economists claim that the practice of competition for scarce resources influences people's attitudes. We take up the idea of making the distinction between attitudes and practices, but in another way than both social psychologists and economists do. Rather than looking into how the practice of contact or of competition influences attitudes, we are interested in whether people follow up on their attitudes in practice. If people do not follow up on their attitudes in their actual practices with people with migration background the impact changes. Therefore, we want to know whether people who express negative attitudes towards diversity also follow up on them when engaging with people with migration background. One can think of encounters with neighbours, colleagues at work or in public spaces. It is in these real-life every day encounters that people influence the societal processes that the reviewed literature addresses. In developing our model, we research, rather than assume, whether people who express negative attitudes regarding ethnic diversity also have a practice in line with those attitudes. This is an important mechanism to look at, because when people indeed follow up on their attitudes in practice, this impacts people with migration background involved in interactions with them. If we want to measure the potential impact of attitudes, we should include this ambivalence: people who express in their attitudes to be negative about people with a migration background, can be positive in their actual practices, and vice versa. Only by looking at these mechanisms as interlinked processes can we weigh them against each other and predict the overall impact. To assess the weight of that impact we propose to also consider the positions of power that people hold. There are big differences in the positions of power among the people without migration background. Some have a lot of power and their actions have a lot of impact, while others have far less power to impact the context around them. We will, for instance, analyse the impact people in leadership positions have to promote or reject openness and inclusion in an ethnically diverse context. We realize that the impact we assess cannot be equated with actual outcomes for people with migration background. But even with that important caveat in mind we think it is important to assess the dominant force (pushing for inclusion or for exclusion) in a certain context. We do not argue that a dominant force characterized by openness and inclusion automatically leads to a

better position of people with migration background in a context, however, if it is characterized by rejection of cultural differences and exclusion, we assume that the impact on people with migration background will be more negative in that context. Empirical research will have to establish the strength of the relationship between the two.

To sum up, below we will build a theoretical model that we operationalize methodologically by linking the above ideas together. The starting point is that people without migration background show certain attitudes towards ethnic diversity (more open or more rejecting), that they will follow up – or not – on their attitudes in interactions in the actual practice of interethnic contact, and, that these attitudes and practices combined with their positions of power have an impact on the openness towards or rejection of ethnic diversity in the context in which this takes place.

The diversity attitudes and practices impact scales

Our aim is to assess the overall impact of the different diversity attitudes and practices of people without migration background in an ethnically diverse context considering people's position of power. Using both theoretical and empirical building blocks, we have developed a theoretical model that we coin the Diversity Attitudes and Practices Impact (DAPI) scales. We start out in step one with attitudes, in step two we analyse whether attitudes translate into practices in interaction with people with migration background. In step three we analyse whether people are in a position of power to assess the potential impact of their actions and practices.

In the DAPI model, referring to the literature discussed above, we will distinguish between the economic and the cultural domain. One can imagine that people without migration background are open to sharing economic power and are striving for more equality, while they are culturally less open and inclusive, or the other way around. Therefore, both domains potentially reveal different mechanisms.

In the literature we have identified key drivers for the opposite positions captured in the model. For the people who see migration and ethnic diversity as an economic threat, economic vulnerability and competition are mentioned as key factors explaining their position. Furthermore, resentment and perceived reversed discrimination are mentioned and the feeling that politicians are ignoring their complaints about economic and cultural threats. For the people who see migration and ethnic diversity as an economic contribution and cultural enrichment to their country, committing to social justice and solidarity are key drivers according to the literature. This is combined with a critical stand to their own national culture and western cultural dominance. The literature also mentions potential gains, like a feeling of safety and trust because of more equal and open relations.

Furthermore, interethnic contact is considered important for people to be more positive towards ethnic diversity.

Based on the theoretical considerations visualized in Figure 1, we developed a methodological model (Figure 2) showing two forces pushing in opposite directions. The force pushing to the right shows in three steps (attitudes, practice and the exercise of power) the push towards more equality and inclusion. The forces to the left shows in the same three steps (attitudes, practice and the exercise of power) to what extent power is used to actively exclude or include people with migration background and the openness towards or rejection of cultural diversity.

In the left part of the model, we find people without migration background who reject ethnic diversity. When this part of the model is strongly represented, we can expect to see a context with a high level of perceived threat, perceived competition over socio-economic resources or regarding cultural identity. People without migration background in this position may perceive a loss of socio-economic status or feel that they, seeing themselves as the norm group, are culturally threatened. Due to a sense of entitlement to be in the dominant position, these people will likely show resentment.

In the right part of the model, we find people without migration background who push for more equality and openness. They, for instance, facilitate more equality by accepting colleagues with migration background in the workplace. In terms of value systems, these people show more openness towards cultural diversity. In this group there is potentially a sub group,


Figure 1. Key drivers explaining the two positions in the DAPI scales. DAPI scales, Crul and Lelie (2019).

Figure 2. The Diversity Attitudes and Practices Impact scales. DAPI scales, Crul and Lelie (2019).

who are critical about their own ethnic and or racial group because of the colonial history, slavery and present-day forms of discrimination.

The model enables us to see the size of the group in all three segments of the two opposing parts and assess, for instance at the level of a neighbourhood or a city, which push is strongest, and to which side the scales will likely tip. Comparing outcomes for different city contexts in different national contexts will be part of our research project in the future.

We think that our model is a contribution to existing theoretical frameworks for several reasons. First, we aim to fill the void of largely omitting the attitudes and practices of the most powerful category of people in the ethnic hierarchy, those without migration background, on social interactions in ethnically diverse contexts. Through their attitudes and practices, they determine, to a large extent, the context for people from less powerful categories. By including our target group, we paint a more complete picture of the dynamics in the ethnically diverse context. Secondly, in most assimilation and integration theories, the people without migration background are presented as a homogeneous category. This obscures the internal diversity. People without migration background, indeed, often show very different reactions to the increased ethnic diversity around them. This means that the experiences in the various contexts in which people with migration background live, work, study or do sports, for example, may vary considerably depending on which type of reactions from people without migration background have the upper hand.

The methodological model demonstrated. The example of the majority minority city Rotterdam

Based on the theoretical assumptions formulated in the previous section we will empirically demonstrate the DAPI model in three steps: (1) Looking at

attitudes towards diversity in the economic and the cultural domains separately; (2) Analysing how people translate their attitudes into their actual practices; (3) Analysing whether people are in a position of potential power that gives more weight to their push towards either more inclusion and cultural openness or towards more exclusion of other ethnic groups and rejection of other cultures.

To demonstrate the DAPI model, we make use of a new data-set collected in six European cities (Amsterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg, Malmö, Rotterdam and Vienna) in 2019 in the ERC Advanced project Becoming a Minority (BaM). In each city we collected 400 interviews with people without migration background between the age of 25 and 45 in all majority-minority neighbourhoods in that city. The main reason to focus on Rotterdam in this article is that the city has a strong political polarization vis-a-vis the topic of migration and ethnic diversity. In the last local election (2018), 25 per cent of the voters voted for the anti-immigrant party *Leefbaar Rotterdam* (Livable Rotterdam, of the late Pim Fortuyn) or for the anti-immigrant Party For Freedom of Geert Wilders (PVV). If we assume that people with migration background did most likely not vote in great numbers for these parties, the voters without migration background gave their vote to anti-immigrant parties in huge numbers. Having the most extensive secondary data available on people without migration background in the city of Rotterdam, this allows us to also weigh the BaM respondents according to their voting in the local elections.

In Rotterdam, we interviewed 428 respondents in 2019. The BaM survey was sampled in majority minority neighbourhoods of the city. Majority minority neighbourhoods are characterized by the fact that there is no longer an ethnic group forming a numerical majority, also not the people of Dutch descent. More than 40 per cent of the Rotterdam neighbourhoods belong to this category. We focussed on these neighborhoods to understand how people without migration background experience living in such ethnically diverse settings. The sample was drawn from the city register and included all majority minority neighbourhoods in the city. Respondents were selected based on country of birth of the respondent and country of birth of the parents. If the respondent was born in the Netherlands and both parents were also born in The Netherlands, they fit the sample. We collected interviews through three strategies. First, we approached people through a letter containing a code allowing people to access a link and fill out the survey online. Second, we approached people who didn't react to the letter with a written questionnaire and a return envelope. Third, we approached people for a face-to-face interview on their address in case they didn't respond to this letter either. The combination of these three different methods aimed to capture respondents with different background characteristics.

With near to 650,000 inhabitants, Rotterdam is the second largest city in the Netherlands. The harbour city has attracted workers from all over the world for centuries, reflected by the 206 nationalities present. The largest immigrant groups have origins in Morocco, Turkey and Surinam. Rotterdam also has a relatively large community from the Dutch Antilles and from Cape Verde. Rotterdam as a whole is a majority minority city since 2017.

For this article we weighted the respondents according to the political preference for the local elections in Rotterdam, taking into account that 45.1 per cent of the eligible voters voted (Rotterdam 2018). Voters of anti-immigrant parties were underrepresented among the BaM survey respondents, while voters for the Green Left Party (Groen Links) and the Liberal progressive party (D'66) were overrepresented. Therefore, in the BaM survey we weigh the anti-immigrant party voters and the voters for the two progressive parties according to their shares (respectively 25 and 20 per cent) in the municipal elections of 2018 (Rotterdam 2018). We assume that voters for the Green Left and the Liberal Progressive party D'66 are more or less representing the demographic of the city, while we doubled the weight for the anti-immigrant voters among the respondents who indicated they voted, assuming that people of migrant background (about half of the voters in Rotterdam) would mostly not vote for anti-immigrant parties in great numbers. As a small group of people with a migration background did vote for these anti-immigrant parties, this probably leads to a very small overrepresentation in our weighted data for people voting for anti-immigrant parties.

The economic domain

We will first show the results for the economic domain. We have analysed attitudes regarding migration being either a potential economic threat or a potential economic advantage. We compile a scale on three BaM survey questions that all have an eleven-point scale from zero to ten with five as a middle point:

(1) "Are you of the opinion that people who come to live here from other countries in general take away jobs or contribute to new jobs".
(2) "Is it in general good or bad for the Dutch economy that people from other countries come to live here?"
(3) "Do people who come to live here from other countries make more use or less use of the social welfare system?"

The Cronbach's Alfa for what we will call the *Socio-Economic Threat or Socio-Economic Contribution Scale* is: 0.790.

The Economic Threat or Economic Contribution scale (from now on ET/EC scale) is recoded into three-categories: from the eleven point scale we coded

respondents scoring zero to five as people who express to see an economic threat, respondents scoring seven to eleven as people who, on the contrary, express to see an economic contribution and the respondents that scored five to seven as the group in the middle. As you can see in Table 1, a large share of respondents can be found in the middle.

The literature puts a big emphasis on differences in reactions to migration and ethnic diversity based on people's economic position. We tested what is the most determining outcome in relation to the ET/EC scale: education or income? We find a much stronger positive correlation with being higher educated ($R=+0.27$ & $P<0.001$) than with having a higher income ($R=+0.16$ & $P<0.05$) and expressing to see an economic contribution (EC). This seems to suggest that it is rather education than socio-economic position driving the perception of economic threat. We further looked what is the most important cut-off point for education. The most decisive difference is found between the higher educated (diploma of Higher Education) and the lower educated (no diploma of Higher Education). Hence, to test our model, we distinguish between lower and higher educated people. In the city for which we run the analysis, Rotterdam, 45.8 per cent of our target group in the age group 18–30 years are higher educated and 54.2 per cent are lower educated. This results in the following weighted outcomes for the ET/EC scale for lower and higher educated people based on the BaM survey in Table 1.

As the literature predicted, the lower educated group that sees immigration as an economic threat is large (45 per cent), but, also, 19 per cent of this group sees an economic contribution from people with a migration background. Among the higher educated, 19 per cent expresses people with a migration background to pose an economic threat, and 41 per cent a contribution. It's almost exactly the opposite.

We will look at the importance of some of the key drivers for economic threat. The most important reasons mentioned in the literature are that people with lower educational credentials experience more competition in the labour market and often are in a more vulnerable economic position. We can measure this in our survey in two ways. First, we have data about the number of co-workers with a migration background in the workplace. We argue that especially feelings of competition could grow when colleagues with a migration background make up half or more of the colleagues in the

Table 1. Lower and higher educated people without migration background in Rotterdam age 25–45 in majority minority neighbourhoods, socio-economic threat or socio-economic contribution scale.

	Economic Threat	Middle Point	Economic Contribution
Lower Educated	45%	36%	19%
Higher Educated	19%	40%	41%

Source: BaM survey Rotterdam 2019.

workplace. We find a considerable difference in the presence of co-workers with a migration background between the lower and higher educated. Of the lower educated, 38 per cent has 50 per cent or more colleagues with a migration background. Among the higher educated, this is only 18 per cent. We tested whether this percentage correlates with people's answers on the ET/EC scale. Neither for the lower educated nor for the higher educated do we see a significant correlation.

For economic vulnerability there are two kinds of criteria in the survey. The first is about protection through labour contracts. The higher educated turn out to have a temporary contract more often than the lower educated (25 and 18 per cent respectively). We again find no significant difference in opinions about a potential economic threat between those with temporary and those with fixed contracts. The vulnerability in terms of income is, not surprisingly, very different between the lower and the higher educated. But even when we test within the lower educated group whether income differences correlate with the outcome for the ET/EC scale, there is, again, no significant correlation. We also tested whether gender is influencing outcomes for the ET/EC scale, but did not find any significant correlation. The data does not reveal differences in outcomes for men and women.

In a second step, we look at the practice of encounters with co-workers with a migration background at the workplace (See Figures 3 and 4). How do people without migration background evaluate their relations with colleagues with a migration background? We see that a substantial group that expressed an economic threat evaluates these contacts in practice as positive. In case of the lower educated group, about a third who expressed migration to be an economic threat is positive when it comes to personal contact with colleagues with a migration background. Putting these outcomes in our model (see Figure 3) for the lower educated people (100 per cent), we see


Figure 3. DAPI Scales. The Economic Domain, *Lower* Educated People without migration background in Rotterdam: Diversity Attitudes and Practices and their Impact. Source: BaM survey Rotterdam (2018).

Figure 4. DAPI Scales. The Economic Domain, *Higher* Educated People without migration background in Rotterdam: Diversity Attitudes and Practices and their Impact. Source: BaM survey Rotterdam 2019.

how in the first step we go to 45 per cent who see migrants as an economic threat, and then to 30 per cent who express this AND also follow up on this by expressing a negative or neutral opinion about contact with colleagues with a migration background. These negative attitudes and practices can potentially translate into a negative atmosphere in the workplace. These attitudes and practices become even more consequential if these people have a supervisory position. We find that only 6 per cent of the lower educated group ticks all three boxes: expressing feelings of economic threat, following this up in practice and being in a position of power. Among the higher educated (see Figure 4) we start out with a much smaller group expressing attitudes of economic threat (19 per cent). In the actual situation of the workplace, only 6 per cent remain who express an economic threat AND have a negative or neutral opinion about their relation with their co-workers with a migration background. Thus, only very few follow up on their attitudes in practice. Of those who do, about half (3 per cent) have a supervisory position. If we now look at the lower educated group (see Figure 3) who say migrants are a contribution to the economy (the right side of the scales in Figure 2) we first go to 19 per cent based on the ET/EC scale's outcomes on attitudes. In the actual situation of the workplace, the majority of this group (10 per cent) is also positive about their relation with their colleagues with a migration background. If we again select those who have a supervisory position, 6 per cent remain who can also follow up on their attitudes from a position of power. The group of higher educated people who see immigrants as an economic contribution is, with 41 per cent, much bigger to start with (see Figure 4). And almost all are positive about their relation with their colleagues with a migration background, which leading to a percentage of 39 who both see an economic advantage AND are positive about their colleagues, and 15 per cent also has a supervisory position.

On the one hand, we see that people who are higher educated (see Figure 4) more often regard people with a migration background to present an economic contribution and are positive about co-workers with a migration background and that this group harbours a considerable number in a position of power. On the other hand, we see that the percentage of the lower educated group (see Figure 3) that considers people with a migration background to be an economic threat is high, but *a third* of these people does not follow up on their negative attitude in practice. And only one in five of these people is in a position of power (6 per cent). Though among the lower educated more than twice as many people express to see an economic threat, in the end, those among the lower educated who see people with a migration background as contributing *and* are in a position of power also amount to 6 per cent. From them, more than half has a supervising position. We can only speculate why relatively few people perceiving an economic threat are appointed to supervising others. Maybe employers choose supervisors with intercultural competences in the ethnically diverse practice of the city?

In the higher educated group, people in supervising positions are overwhelmingly seeing people with a migration background as contributing, and they are positive about them as colleagues. At the same time, there is an increasing number of supervisors in the cities that are themselves of migration background. Of the lower educated group, 29 per cent say they have a supervisor with a migration background and this is true for 28 per cent in the higher educated group. One can assume that these supervisors will also push for more inclusion in the labour market. Although there is a somewhat higher percentage of our target group expressing the attitude of seeing economic threat, the impact shifts when we look at the practice. And when we zoom in on those in a position of power, the balance shifts even more: more people push towards inclusion and openness towards colleagues with other ethnic backgrounds.

As we discovered, pure economic factors like flexible contracts or the amount of economic competition do not predict feelings of economic threat. Following the literature, especially Lamont and Hochschild, we analysed whether the other identified key drivers (resentment, feelings of being abandoned by politicians and perceived reversed discrimination) are predicting feelings of economic threat (Table 2).

There is indeed a strong positive correlation between the idea that people of migrant background are "getting preferential treatment" and expressing an economic threat ($R^2=+0.57$ & $P<0.001$). There is also a significant positive correlation between feeling abandoned by politicians ($R^2=+0.46$ & $P<0.001$) and expressing an economic threat and also a positive correlation between expressing an economic threat and the feeling that "people like myself are systematically ignored" ($R^2=+0.50$ & $P<0.001$). Also, the question "how often people <u>without</u> migration background experience discrimination"

Table 2. Descriptive statistics key drivers of economic threat and contribution.

	(Obs) N	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Preferential treatment	350	1	5	3.20	0.957
Abandonment by politicians	410	1	5	2.98	1.067
Systematically ignored	411	1	5	4.02	0.974
Reversed discrimination	390	1	5	2.66	0.859
Politicians should support migrants	408	1	5	3.00	1.029
Political scale right to left	400	1	7	3.61	1.466

Source: BaM survey Rotterdam 2019.

correlates positive (R^2=+0.25 & P<0.001) with expressing an economic threat through the ET/EC scale. The idea that people who express to see an economic threat upturn the discrimination argument and argue that they are the ones being discriminated against seems to be confirmed by our data. This amalgam of thoughts and attitudes bears resemblance with the "deep story" Hochschild has described (Hochschild 2016, 144).

If we look at those who express to see a contribution of people with a migration background to the economy as a whole, to jobs and to the welfare state, already based on these three items, we see that the argument of social justice is strongly represented in their opinions. People expressing an economic contribution in the EC/EC scale show a significant positive correlation (R^2=+0.59 & P<0.001) with the statement that politicians should do more to support the interests of people with a migration background. We also see a strong correlation with them seeing themselves politically leaning to the left (R=+0.45 & P<0.001). The idea that the opinions on ethnic diversity are part of a larger ideological stand on social justice seems to be confirmed by our data.

The cultural domain

We now move to the cultural domain. Again, we are interested in both attitudes and practices. We use a notion of culture close to that of Bourdieu (1977, 1984). It is through cultural practices that people construct culture and become constructed by culture. And this happens especially in institutions where culture becomes codified in what Hannerz (1992) and others have coined the cultural apparatus. Like we explained in the theoretical framework, our starting point is that there is de facto an unequal power relation, in which cultural norms and values (in all its internal diversity) of people without migration background are the norm in society. This hierarchy is sustained using the power and resources to promote these norms and values, for example through institutionalized forms of culture in government bodies, schools, companies, media and arts.

One of the major challenges in the BaM research has been to ask people about culture, given the very different subjective views people have on how

culture operates, and on whether culture can or cannot be defined as an ethnic or national culture. We want to capture how people view culture and how they use the concept of culture to make sense of the ethnically diverse context they live in (Brubaker 2005). This is, needless to say, different from how we use the concept analytically. Important for us was that we could measure whether those who believe there is such a thing as Dutch, German or Swedish culture feel that this culture is threatened by people with a migrant background who bring their "ethnic" culture. By stating it like this we tap into the subjective meaning, capturing the feelings a subgroup of people without migration background express. Another subgroup of people resists the idea of a homogeneous national or ethnic culture. At the same time, this group does acknowledge and often celebrates ethnic and cultural diversity in ways that also reifies ethnic cultures. We wanted to capture both subjective positions in our survey. To operationalize this, we first examine if people without migration background see the cultural norms and values of people with a migration background as *threatening* or *enriching* to their own "ethnic culture", Then, in a second step, we investigate if they are open to other cultural practices from people with a migration background, Then, in a third step, if they hold a position of power to re(shape) culture in institutions.

We first introduce the *Cultural Threat or Cultural Enrichment scale* (CT/CE scale) based on three questions in the BaM survey:

(1) "Is the Dutch cultural life generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?"
(2) "Dutch schools should adapt more to the diverse cultural backgrounds of their pupils (e.g. taking into account pupils' culturally related food restrictions)"
(3) "Dutch people should learn more about the cultural way of life of people with migration background (e.g. learning about religious or cultural feasts)"

The Cronbach's Alfa for the scale is 0.801.

Again, we checked whether education or income correlates with the cultural threat or cultural enrichment scale. Indeed, we again find a stronger correlation for education ($R^2=+0.24$ & $P<0.001$) than for income ($R^2=+0.09$ & $P<0.1$) (Table 3).

In this domain, 52 per cent of the lower educated express to see a cultural threat, while for the higher educated group it is 25 per cent. We see the opposite for cultural enrichment: 18 per cent of the lower educated group versus 44 per cent of the higher educated. In the second step we look at practices again. While numerous surveys have been conducted asking people with a migration background whether they have adapted their cultural norms and

Table 3. Lower and higher educated people without migration background in Rotterdam aged 25–45 in majority minority neighbourhoods, Cultural Threat or Cultural Enrichment scale.

	Cultural Threat	Middle Point	Cultural Enrichment
Lower Educated	52%	30%	18%
Higher Educated	25%	31%	44%

Source: BaM survey Rotterdam 2019.

values, there are hardly any surveys asking people without migration background whether they are open to or have taken over cultural elements from people with migration background. We have constructed a cultural practices scale to measure this based on three questions from the BaM survey which all have a five-point scale, going from "never" to "often". The questions focus on three practices related to potential (dis-) engagement with other cultural practices. We constructed a three-point scale with the score of 1 including the positions "never" and "almost never", 2 "sometimes" and 3 "often" and "very often".

(1) "Did you ever adopt a habit from a different culture?"
(2) "Have you been to festivals where other cultural traditions are being celebrated (e.g. food festival, music and dance festival)?"
(3) "How often have you learned a few words in another language to be able to make contact with your neighbours with a migration background?"

The Cronbach alfa is 0.636.

Among the lower educated, the group that expresses a cultural threat and *also* does not engage practically is reduced from 52 to 42 per cent (see Figure 5). In the higher educated group 16 per cent ticks both the box of feeling


Figure 5. DAPI Scales. The Cultural Domain, *Lower* Educated People without migration background in Rotterdam: Diversity Attitudes and Practices and their Impact. Source: BaM Survey 2019, Rotterdam.

cultural threat and the box of resistance to other cultural practices (see Figure 6). Of the lower educated group, 18 per cent is expressing that cultural diversity is enriching. However, not all of them follow up on this attitude in their cultural practices (engaging "sometimes" or "often" in other cultural practices). This reduces the group to 11 per cent who both in attitudes and in practices are open to and engaging in other cultural practices. Among the higher educated, the group is much larger, 44 per cent, but also here many do not follow up on their attitude in practice (meaning they scored "never" or "almost never" for engaging in other cultural practices) reducing the group that ticks both boxes to 25 per cent.

In the third step, we look again for the position to exercise power. Regarding culture this plays out slightly different from the workplace where a supervisory position is a clear-cut position of power. Regarding culture, one could imagine that those who follow up on their attitudes in practice by definition will influence the climate in their interaction with neighbours, other parents in the school of their children, or colleagues at their workplace. However, some people, because of their professional function, have more power to (re)define cultural norms and values. We can think of, for example, teachers, health care and social workers, policy makers, people in HRM, but also creatives, like actors or architects, in shaping the cultural values and norms (cultural apparatus) in ethnically diverse settings (Hannerz 1992).

As we can see in Figure 5, the lower educated group expressing cultural threat and following up on this attitude in practice is further reduced to 8 per cent when we only select people in a professional position in which they can exercise power in the cultural domain. In the higher educated group 9 per cent is in such positions of definitional power (Figure 6). Of those expressing enrichment and following up on this attitude in practice,


Figure 6. DAPI Scales. The Cultural Domain, *Higher* Educated People without migration background in Rotterdam: Diversity Attitudes and Practices and their Impact. Source: BaM Survey 2019, Rotterdam.

5 per cent of the lower educated and 18 per cent of the higher educated are in a profession enabling to (re)define cultural norms and values.

In the cultural domain we see a lot more resistance towards ethnic diversity from people without migration background than in economic domain. Other than in the economic domain, people also overwhelmingly follow up on their cultural threat attitudes in practice, especially in the lower educated group. But again, overall, the group that has definitional power and accepts cultural diversity (the third segment on the right side of Figures 5 and 6) is one and a half times the size of the group that has definitional power and rejects cultural diversity (on the left side of Figures 5 and 6).

The higher educated people are more often in the professional position to change cultural norms and values in institutions. Given that people with a migrant background also increasingly are in professional positions with this definitional power, the overall tendency will be geared towards more cultural openness and diversity.

What are the key drivers behind the perceived cultural threat or cultural enrichment? We tested the key drivers described in Table 4.

Like with the ET/EC scale, we found a strong positive correlation with feelings of being abandoned by politicians ($R^2=+0.52$ & $P<0.001$) and expressing cultural threat as well as a positive correlation ($R^2= +0.18$ & $P<0.005$) with perceived discrimination against people *without* a migration background. One of the salient things mentioned on cultural threat in the literature is the context of becoming a (numerical) minority (Danbold and Huo 2015). In the BaM data, we find indeed a positive correlation ($R^2=+0.27$ & $P<0.001$) between the feeling of becoming a minority and the attitude of seeing diversity as a cultural threat.

What we described earlier as the position of "liberal cosmopolitans", people critical of their own ethnic group and culture, does seem to somewhat correspond with the CT/CE scale. There is a negative correlation with how proud people are to be Dutch ($R^2=-0.23$ & $P<0.001$) as well as with whether people think "Dutch culture is superior to other cultures in the world" ($R^2=-0.33$ & $P<0.001$).

Table 4. Descriptive statistics key drivers of cultural threat or enrichment.

	(Obs) N	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Abandonment by politicians	410	1	5	2.98	1.067
Reversed discrimination	390	1	5	2.66	0.859
Becoming a minority	410	1	2	1.67	0.471
Proud to be Dutch	418	1	5	2.24	0.924
Dutch culture is superior	418	1	5	3.78	1.054
Feeling at home	423	1	5	2.06	1.031
People are to be trusted	403	1	5	2.80	0.939
Scolded at	423	1	2	1.22	0.415
Physically attacked	423	1	2	1.11	0.312

Source: BaM survey Rotterdam 2019.

An important, though often neglected, question regarding living in an ethically divers setting is what the possible gains are for people without migration background who regard diversity as positive. There is a positive correlation between "feeling at home in the neighborhood" ($R^2=+0.31$ & $P<0.001$) and expressing cultural enrichment as well as a positive correlation between how much "people in the neighbourhood are to be trusted" and cultural enrichment through the CT/CE scale ($R^2=+0.35$ & $P<0.001$). There is also a significant negative correlation ($R^2=-0.19$ & $P<0.001$) with reported experiences of being scolded at in the neighbourhood as well as a negative correlation with reported experiences of being physically attacked ($R^2=-0.21$ & $P<0.001$) and expressing cultural enrichment.

Discussion and conclusion

Based on a number of theoretical assumptions in the reviewed literature, we have developed both a new theoretical model and the methodological Diversity Attitudes and Practices Impact (DAPI) scales to describe and quantify the impact of both attitudes and practices of people without migration background in ethnically diverse contexts in relation to their positions of power. There has, to our knowledge, not been an earlier attempt to quantify this. People without migration background, being members of the group in the dominant position, have power to either push for the inclusion or for the exclusion of people with a migrant background in both the economic and the cultural domain.

Most research focussed on (subgroups of) people without migration background resisting increased ethnic and migration-related diversity, and on the effect their stance has on the societal climate. So far, little research has looked into the other subgroup of people without migration background who are supportive of an ethnically diverse society and the influence of their attitudes and practices in both the economic and the cultural domain. Even less research has brought these opposite forces in the picture together. These forces are pushing for change into opposite directions, at the same time. Another key element of our theoretical model is the assessment of positions of power to measure the weight of the impact the respective pushes for inclusion and exclusion will have.

Based on the literature we identified key drivers for both positions. Interestingly, when revisiting these key drivers, we did not find support for the widely assumed relation between economic vulnerability and or competition and perceived economic threat. Other key drivers like resentment, feeling abandoned by politicians and perceived reversed discrimination are confirmed. These are also the key drivers for cultural threat. On the opposite side, for those who see people with a migration background as an economic contribution and cultural enrichment for the country, the identified key

drivers like pushing for social justice and a critical stand towards the own national culture are statistically confirmed to indeed play a role. For these people, gains like a feeling of safety and trust are also confirmed by the BaM data.

With the development of our theoretical model we wanted to address a major shortcoming in existing grand theories of assimilation. Neo and segmented assimilation models largely predict outcomes based on the attitudes and practices of people with migration background. The attitudes and practices of people *without* migration background are not part of these explanatory models. In earlier research we have pointed to the importance of national institutional arrangements in predicting outcomes for people with migration background across different country contexts (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012). We argued, and empirically confirmed that these institutional arrangements were more important in predicting educational and labour market outcomes than ethnic background characteristics of migrant groups. The emphasis on ethnicity, the "ethnic lens", so prominent in the field of migration and ethnic studies, is further challenged in this research. More and more scholars criticize the ethnic lens and are promoting research that argues for different units of analysis (Dahinden 2016). This includes doing research on all people living in certain geographical areas, or focus on people with similar socio-economic positions or professions, regardless of their ethnic background, or analysing the interactions between people with and without migration background (Dahinden 2016). Our approach here can be categorized under the third type of proposed research. By looking at the category of people without migration background we purposely move away from the emphasis on the supposed ethnic characteristics of the migrant groups. One of the main critiques on the view through the ethnic lens is the perception of ethnic groups as being cultural homogeneous, omitting internal differences and complexities within the group. The same happens when the ethnic majority group is used as the norm group to which other ethnic groups are measured: because of the common use of averages in quantitative analysis, the differences within the ethnic majority group are disguised. In our approach we start from the assumption that people without migration background are internally a diverse category, expressing very different attitudes and practices vis-a-vis the increased ethnic diversity in society. To assess their impact we need to analyse these often-opposing attitudes and practices. They have an impact on the inclusion or exclusion of people with a migration background, on the daily life in neighbourhoods, on the societal climate in general. By assessing the impact of people without migration background on ethnically diverse contexts we are adding an important piece of the puzzle to assimilation and integration research.

The first empirical demonstration of the Diversity Attitudes and Practices Impact (DAPI) model shows that in the case of the majority minority city Rotterdam, even while only a minority of the people without migration background is expressing a positive attitude towards ethnic diversity and people with a migration background, at the same time, their practices, for example in the workplace, show that the majority is positive about their colleagues with a migration background. If we then analyse who is in a position of power, the balance is tilted even further towards a push for inclusion and equality. This might explain one of the paradoxes of the social reality we see, also in many cities harbouring a great deal of "anti-immigrant" sentiments. Though discrimination and exclusion in the labour market by people without migration background is evident and well documented, at the same time the labour market does become ethnically more diverse, at all levels. This is the result of people with a migration background pushing to enter into more prestigious positions, working harder than colleagues without migration background, being determined and persistent and able to find allies among colleagues and supervisors without migration background (See Çankaya and Mepschen 2019; Crul et al. 2017; Keskiner and Crul 2017; Konyali and Crul 2017; Rezai 2017; Slootman 2019; Waldring, Crul, and Ghorashi 2015). In this article we have added the role of people without migration background in this process.

In the cultural domain the situation is different, because not only is the share of people without migration background that expresses to see a cultural threat much larger, in this domain the power to influence the climate is also more equally distributed among people with and without power positions. People influence the societal climate in their interactions with neighbours, colleagues or in the schools of their children by expressing their opinions.

However, also in the cultural domain there are people with more power to define cultural values and norms, due to their professional position. Think of, for example, creatives, school principals, medical workers or social workers. The BaM survey data shows that in this category of people there is a greater openness towards other cultural norms, values and cultural expressions and a less strict adherence to the national cultural norms and values. Here we see yet another paradox: though people without migration background who express to see a cultural threat are more numerous, at the same time the group of professionals that have more power to (re)define cultural norms and values can shift the balance towards more cultural openness. Think of a school principal without migration background facilitating a religious or cultural holiday observed by members of an ethnic group in her school, or a journalist without migration background paying attention to writers and theatre makers of colour and or migrant background. Many of these smaller and larger actions of people in a certain

position of power add up to a slow but steady openness on the side of the dominant culture to other cultural practices and help create space for other ethnic and cultural groups. This process has hardly been documented and further qualitative and quantitative research would help to bring this to light.

This conclusion, and we want to stress this, does not mean that we think people of migration background are not subject of racism and discrimination in the labour market or that alternative cultural norms and values and cultural expressions are now regarded as equal in society. Indeed, we showed that a considerable share of the people without migration background living in majority minority neighbourhoods is in opposition to the increased ethnic diversity around them. This, without doubt, has a real negative effect on the climate in which people with a migration background live and work. What we conclude, however, is that given the forces at work it is more likely that the societal climate will change in a direction towards more inclusion and cultural openness.

Given the socio-demographic change that is prevalent in most large Western European and North American cities, this change seems an irreversible process. In Rotterdam, under the age of 15 only one in three residents has two parents who are native Dutch. At the same time, in the city, the group of people with low levels of education is shrinking fast, while the higher educated group is more stable or growing, as they can still afford the expensive city. Given the difference in their attitudes towards diversity, this will most likely tip the balance further towards more inclusion and openness. Even though most of the attention in politics and the public debate is focussed on the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments and anti-immigrant parties, the most probable trend regarding ethnic diversity will be one of more inclusion and the normality of cultural diversity.

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ORCID

Maurice Crul http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2003-7826
Frans Lelie http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0499-4412

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